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The essays collected in this issue explore a variety of subjects, but 
collectively they enrich our understanding of a major aspect of America's 
development known as modernization. In recent years, the concept of 
modernization has been employed with increasing frequency to explain 
long-term trends in the United States, and its use has generated 
considerable controversy among students of American history. I would 
like to discuss briefly the application of this concept to social change 
in America, since it provides a theoretical frame within which to 
consider the essays. 
Modernization scholarship has not as yet produced a generally agreed 
upon definition of modernization. There are, I believe, two major 
reasons for this, One being that most of the evidence supporting the 
concept derives from cross-cultural analyses rather than studies of given 
cultures over long periods of time. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, modernization is usually conceived of as open-ended. 
For example, C. E. Black observes, "Even the most advanced countries 
are still modernizing," and then he immediately suggests an important 
theoretical problem inherent in this interpretation: ". . . it is only by an 
effort of the imagination that one can conjecture which of their features 
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are likely to be characteristic of all modern societies and which are 
simply culture-oriented idiosyncrasies of individual societies."1 
Since many of the changes associated with modernization never reach 
fruition,2 it might logically be thought of as a continuous process. 
On the other hand, such an interpretation means that the definiton of 
modernization will continue to be relative, descriptive and subject to 
continual up-dating. As part of a forthcoming study of political change 
in the United States,3 my two co-authors and I find compelling evidence 
that, in the American experience at least, the modernization process 
has a beginning and an end and therefore may be treated as a 
distinct period in America's development. Such treatment may in turn 
help clarify the concept of modernization. 
While writers on modernization agree that economic, social and 
political factors are interdependent, they tend to portray the economic 
sector as most important to the entire society. Neil Smelser adds an 
ecological dimension to this economic focus and, for our purposes, 
adequately identifies major modernizing trends in America's history. 
He suggests that a modernizing society will move toward the following 
conditions: the application of scientific knowledge to technology; 
the commercial production of agricultural goods; men working in 
industry for wages at power-driven machines that produce commodities 
marketed outside the community of production; and urban 
concentrations.4 Following Smelser's and other (less succinct) definitions, 
my colleagues and I combine in a single measure a series of social and 
technological variables commonly associated with modernization. 
This modernization measure incorporates the following variables: 
production of mineral 
fuel energy per unit of 
population; pig iron 
shipments per unit of 
population; miles of 
railroad track owned by 
railroad companies per 
unit of population; 
patents issued per unit of 
population; proportion 
of the population living 
in communities of 
100,000 or more; 
proportion of the work 
force engaged in non-
agricultural pursuits; and 
the birth rate for white 
females.5 If one traces the measure over the history of the United States, 
the result is a "modernization curve" that behaves as shown in the 
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figure on page 5. Once modernizing change "takes off" in the 1840's, 
it continues to increase at a remarkable rate until 1910. Between 1910 
and 1920, its rate of increase slows. From 1920 to the present, the 
measure indicates that modernizing change reaches a virtual "steady 
state." During this most recent period, rapid change continues in 
American society but in areas other than those that were dominant in 
the last half of the nineteenth century. 
Although modernization accelerates markedly at 1840, some 
modernizing change was occurring from the beginning of the Republic 
(and undoubtedly in some ways it was occurring long before that). 
The extent to which the United States was "pre-modern" or "traditional" 
in its early years is an issue that has received some attention lately in 
historical literature.6 In some respects the nation was probably "born 
modern," but it is undeniable that during the nineteenth century it 
experienced profound changes in the composition of its population, 
in the living arrangements and working conditions of its people, and in 
the production and distribution of its goods, all of which created a 
society fundamentally different from the one that started the "Great 
Experiment."7 Frank Fox's article in this issue provides a definition of 
traditional society and explores the manner in which the United States 
broke away from its "pre-industrial" past. 
The period of modernization as it is reflected in the graph above 
ended more abruptly than it began. I should emphasize that the "end of 
modernization" does not mean that processes begun in the early 
nineteenth century have come to an end. Rather, it means that 
modernizing change no longer increases, while other types of change 
"take off," much as modernization did in the 1840's. These other types 
of change are too complex to cover adequately here.8 Taken together, 
they appear to represent the emergence of new, we might say 
post-modern, social roles and organizations, as well as basic value-
reorientations. 
Others have noted this transition. For example, Kenneth Boulding 
sees the "developed society" (at the end of the nineteenth century) as 
producing a new era that he calls "postcivilization."9 Focusing on 
political development, A. F. K. Organski distinguishes between "bourgeois 
politics," which in the United States is essentially a nineteenth century 
phenomenon, and the "politics of national welfare," which emerges 
early in the twentieth century.10 Elting Morison speaks of a non-material 
dimension of the transition: 
For a long time the design of our technology was determined 
by our necessity to deal with certain external needs as effi-
ciently as possible, dig more coal, go farther, get there 
faster, turn out a wider variety of goods . . . , things we re-
quired to increase our advantage over nature. The record 
of achievement here is beyond all reasonable qualification; 
it is, of course, astounding. But our mechanical triumph 
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may have produced a mechanical atmosphere we can't 
stand. So we may have reached a point where the design of 
our technology must take into greater account our interior 
needs.11 
There also were scholars living through the transition who were aware 
that a new culture was taking shape. Simon N. Patten, for instance, 
posits a shift in this country from a "pain" to a "pleasure" economy.12 
Lester Ward makes use of Patten's terms and adds the notion that the 
pleasure economy involves the satisfaction, not just of material wants, 
but of "higher spiritual aspirations" as well.13 Ward thought that 
under-consumption and lack of purchasing power would be the major 
problems of the "future," whereas the problem of the earlier era had 
been one of increasing production. To Stuart Chase, the new age 
would be marked by economic abundance, while the preceding was 
characterized by the development of the technologies that made 
abundance possible.14 Although they provide it with different names, 
it is clear that these writers are referring to the societal change expressed 
in the modernization curve. 
The articles in this issue of American Studies support (at least 
implicitly) the historical fact of modernization, but they often do so from 
vantage points not included in conventional thinking about 
modernization. Fox explores the emergence of "inventive genius" in 
America and suggests that it resulted from the unique manner in which 
this society threw off the "trappings of the Christian corporate 
commonwealth." He describes this break with the past as a process of 
disorder and reorder. Thus, in an atmosphere of individualism, 
egalitaranism, personal ambition and optimism, American technological 
development was frequently marked by discontinuities rather than by 
a logical progression. To Hamilton Cravens, the case of American 
science, which was beginning to develop a firm institutional base early in 
the nineteenth century, runs counter to the prevailing view of an 
early America "characterized by widespread social and institutional 
disorganization." However, his interpretation is not necessarily 
contradictory to Fox's, since the bond between science and technology— 
though it grows stronger as the society modernizes—is comparatively 
weak at this time. Cravens shows that the distinct social role of 
"scientist" (the term came into common usage in the 1840s) emerged in 
the first half of the century. By the end of the century, fundamental 
changes in American scientific and educational institutions had created 
a new social role for the scientist, that of "trained, specialized 
researcher." The institutional changes that Cravens examines made 
possible the application of scientific knowledge to technology. They 
also set the stage for this country's rise to world prominence in science. 
One of the ramifications of technological development is a constant 
stream of new and "improved" products. Quite often a product will have 
consequences far beyond its intended use. Fred Schroeder links 
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technological innovation in feminine hygiene to the changing social role 
of women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
linkage is not direct, however; Schroeder demonstrates how technological 
innovation influenced social norms and tastes, which in turn modified 
the woman's role. 
Of course, scientific and technological trends represent only one part 
of American modernization. The artistic and philosophical expression of 
the American people was extended and modified as the physical and 
social environments that nurtured it changed; and in turn, that 
expression helped shape the evolving environments. Thomas Schlereth 
examines the interaction between the changing social structure and the 
artistic activity that abounded in Chicago over a fifty-year period, 
pointing especially to the strengthening institutional support for the 
arts. For many reasons, he sees this city as a microcosm of the nation's 
emergence as a modern society. 
Another example of the interaction between social structure and 
artistic creation is provided by Arthur Margon, who traces the changing 
conception of the American hero in fiction to the rise of our urban 
culture. The turn-of-the-century urban environment, he suggests, 
was not compatible with the traditional formulation of individual 
heroism. According to W. T. Lhamon, the Horatio Alger hero personified 
the modern age. The Alger novels articulate a social formula offered 
to late nineteenth century Americans as a blueprint for living. This 
formula, which Lhamon terms one dimensional, proved to be so deeply 
ingrained in American fiction that it survived well into the 
post-modern era. 
The studies included here concentrate on a diversity of events, 
but their observations about a changing United States form a composite 
picture of this country's drive to modernity. While it simply is not 
possible for six studies to express the totality of a process as momentous 
as modernization, they do provide new evidence and fresh perspectives 
on this increasingly employed model of social change. 
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